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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Section 35-1-

14 86, U.C.A., (1953, as amended).
15

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

16
17

1. Whether the respondent's stipulation with Stoddard while represented

18 by counsel and after approval of the commission bars his later re-application for
19 benefits for the same cause.
20

2. Whether the applicant was acting within the course of his employment

21 at the time of the injury.
22

1

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

Section 35-1-90; Rule R568-1-16; Wilburn vs. Interstate Electric, 748 P2d

3 582 (Utah, App., 1988).
4
5
6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Gregory Lynn Biddle received injuries which he claimed were

7 in the course of his employment with Petitioner. Petitioner/employer filed a
8 response claiming that respondent was not within the course of his employment at
9 the time of the injury. Just prior to a hearing on the matter in 1991, the parties
10 settled the matter by the Petitioner agreeing to pay the sum of $5,100 toward
11 respondent's medical expenses. A Stipulation to that effect was submitted
12 providing for a dismissal with prejudice. The Commission through the ALJ
13 approved the settlement. Thereafter in 1993, respondent once again applied for
14 benefits in the same matter. A hearing was held and the ALJ determined that
15 the Stipulation was not binding, the respondent was acting in the course of his
16 employment at the time of the injury and granted benefits. The ALJ further
17 determined that the employer had no funds to pay the award and ordered the
18 Uninsured fund to cover the amounts due. The portion of the decision dealing
19 with the Stipulation and the question as to whether claimant was acting within the
,0 course of his employment was appealed by both the Uninsured fund and the
1 Petitioner. The commission upheld the determination that the earlier Stipulation
I was not binding on the respondent even though he was represented by .

2

isei

1 and further upheld the finding that the respondent was acting in the course of his
2 employment at the time of the injury.
3
4
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are relevant to a determination of this case on appeal are

6 as follows:
7

1. In the fall of 1989, the applicant, Gregory Lynn Biddle, went to work

8 for the defendant, Franklin Lynn Stoddard, dba Water Well & Exploration
9 Drilling (p. 15, line 2).
10

2. Stoddard drills wells on agricultural properties for agricultural and farm

11 culinary purposes (p. 29, lines 14-25; p. 30 lines 1-12).
12

3. Mr, Biddle was only hired to work on certain specific drilling sites and

13 Stoddard paid him only for the time that he was at the site (p. 27, lines 17-24; p.
14 28, lines 17-20).
15

4. On June 4, 1990, Stoddard gave Biddle a ride to work. They stopped

16 on the way because Stoddard wanted to give one of his cousins a hand setting up
17 a drill rig. Biddle decided that he, too, would lend a hand and give Stoddard's
18 cousin a hand setting up the drill rig (p. 28, lines 7-23).
19

5. While Biddle was helping Stoddard's cousin, he crushed his ring and

20 middle fingers of his left hand (p. 18, lines 12-15).
21

6. In October, 1990, Biddle and his attorney, one Gregory Skabelund, filed

22 an application for hearing claiming that Biddle was entitled to payment of medical

3

1

expenses incurred as a result of the accident, temporary total compensation, and

2

permanent total disability (record index pps 1-6).

3
4

7. Stoddard vigorously contested the application, retained counsel and
filed an answer to the application on November 13, 1990 (record index pps 8-9).

5
6

8. Biddle claimed he could not work from June 4, 1990 to October 15,
1990.

7
8

9. O n June 11, 1991, one of the Commission's administrative law judges
mailed a letter to counsel for Stoddard (record index p . 11). It stated:

9

"This letter is a follow-up of the above matter. O u r file indicates

10
11
12
13

that the matter would be settled for $5,100 in medical expenses, and
a stipulation was to be forwarded to our office so we might close
our file. I would appreciate a copy of the Stipulation so we may
conclude our involvement."

14

10. After that, both parties and their lawyers signed a stipulation. It is on

15

file in the Commission's record and states, in pertinent part (records index pps 12-

16

14),

17
"The parties in the above entitled action, hereby stipulate that W.
18
Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling will pay
19
the medical expenses of the Applicant, Gregory Lynn Biddle, in a
J20
sum not to exceed $5,100.
ll
Following said payment, applicant agrees that this action shall be dismissed
22 with prejudice."

33
24
25
26
\1
18
9

An order was appended to the stipulation. One of the Commission's
administrative law judges signed the order which read:
"IT IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D that pursuant to the above
stipulation, that W. Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well Exploration
Drilling pay all of Applicant's uninsured medical expenses incurred
as a result of the industrial accident dated the 4th of June, 1990, as
outlined below up to $5,100: ..."

4

1

11. It is undisputed that the full $5,100 was paid as agreed in the

2 Stipulation and in fact, Mr. Stoddard testified that he had to borrow sufficient
3 funds to pay the settlement and that he is still not finished paying that loan back
4 (p. 31, lines 16-18). In the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion
5 for Review issued by the Commission on October 28, 1993, the commission
6 mistakenly believed that there was a misunderstanding or dispute as to the
7 amount of medical bills. There in fact was no misunderstanding. The parties
8 realized at the hearing where the matter was resolved that the medicals would be
9 more than the $5,100 by some unknown amount (p. 43, lines 5-14). Mr. Biddle
10 agreed to settle for the $5,100 and that is why the stipulation specifically provided
11 that the medicals were to be paid "in a sum not to exceed $5,100". The figures
12 for medical expenses set forth on the settlement document itself come to more
13 than the $5,100. Had Mr. Biddle settled for full payment of all medical expenses
14 by Mr. Stoddard, the Stipulation would have not had a cap, but would have
15 provided that all medical expenses were to be paid by Mr. Stoddard. Because
16 liability really was an issue in good faith, Mr. Biddle agreed to settle for less than
17 his actual medical expenses and he did this upon the advice of and with
18 representation of counsel.
19

12. On July 14, 1992, some two years after the accident, Biddle filed a

20 second application for hearing (record index p 36). He claimed that he was
21 entitled to payment for temporary total compensation, medical expenses and
22 permanent partial disability suffered as a result of the accident.

5

1

13. On February 3, 1993, one of the Commission's administrative law

2 judges held a hearing on the second application with the result as reflected in the
3 record. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued as a result
4 of that hearing, the administrative law judge stated that "The prior application for
5 hearing did not result in a hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to a
6 settlement agreement approved by another ALJ in July of 1991." (record index p.
7 44-52)
8
9
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
When an applicant settles a workers compensation claim brought in the

11 Industrial Commission, is represented by counsel and the agreement is approved
12 by the Commission, that settlement should be final and not subject to reopening
13 by the applicant who may later decide he was misadvised by counsel or that he
14 had not wisely settled the matter.
15

Further, it is clear from the evidence before the commission that the

16 respondent was not working for Petitioner at the time of his injury, but instead
17 took it upon himself to assist Petitioner's cousin. He did so on his own and not in
18 response to any request of Petitioner. Under those circumstances, Petitioner
19 should not be responsible for any injury to Respondent.
>0
1
2

6

1

ARGUMENT

2

AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY, THE APPUCANT WAS ARGUABLY NOT

3

WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

4

The Uninsured Employer's fund in an earlier memorandum in this matter

5 correctly pointed out that the accident must be one "arising out of and in the
6 course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred. . " (Section 35-1-43,
7 UCA, 1953, as amended)
8

It was Mr. Biddle's burden at the hearing to prove this fact.

9

It was undisputed that when Biddle was injured, he was not working at

10 Stoddard's well site. Biddle knew this was not the well he was being taken to
11 work on. In spite of this knowledge, Biddle voluntarily and without being asked,
12 decided to help Mr. Stoddard's cousin with his rig and was injured.
13

Biddle was arguably acting outside of his employment relationship when his

14 injury occurred and this is not a compensable accident. It is also arguable that
15 Petitioner was an agricultural employer not covered by the statute.
16
17

TOE

RESPONDENTS STIPULATION TO A DISMISSAL OF HIS

18

FIRST APPLICATION FOR HEARING BARS THE LATER

19

APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS.

20
21

The starting point for the analysis of this point is Wilburn vs. Interstate

22 Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah. App., 1988). In Wilburn the applicant suffered an

7

1 on the job injury to his back, for which his employer, Interstate Electric, and the
2 Employers Reinsurance Fund paid him permanent partial disability benefits.
3 Wilburn later concluded that he was permanently totally disabled as a result of
4 the injury and made a claim against his former employer for benefits. The
5 employer's lawyer told Wilburn that if he persisted with the claim, they would
6 resist and raise a number of defenses, among them that there had been no
7 accident. Wilburn, unrepresented by counsel, then agreed to settle for some
8 additional permanent partial disability. Approximately three years later, Wilburn
9 filed an application for permanent, total compensation. Interstate Electric raised
10 as a bar to Wilburn's permanent total claim the earlier settlement agreement.
11

The administrative law judge initially ruled against Interstate Electric,

12 finding that there was "no doubt" in his mind as to the compensability of
13 Wilburn's accident. Interstate moved for review and the A U reversed himself
14 finding that there was a bona fide dispute regarding as to the defendant's liability
15 and upheld the settlement agreement. The commission affirmed the ALJ and
16 Wilburn appealed to the Court of Appeals.
\1

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission, and announced that the

18 test for determining the validity of a settlement agreement was, in essence, a
19 subjective one. Although the Court of Appeals, like the AU, said it would have
20 no problem finding Wilburn's claim compensable, nonetheless, it would not
\l

impose its after the fact judgment on the parties.

2

8

1

"While we would have no difficulty in finding the applicant's claim

2

compensable, we agree with the administrative law judge that this

3

determination cannot 'supplant the judgment of those who earlier, in good

4

faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful compensability. Since there is

5

sufficient evidence to support the judge's finding that the parties had a

6

good faith dispute as to the compensability of the claim, we defer to that

7

determination. In view of that finding, Section 35-1-90 is no bar to

8

enforceability of the agreement." 748 P.2d at 586-587. (emphasis added)

9
10

The Commission has adopted a rule, R568-1-16, which governs settlement

11 agreements in worker's compensation claims. In its entirety it reads:
12
13

"A.

14

employee to waive his rights. Settlement agreements are appropriate,

15

however, when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one of doubtful

16

compensability.

17

Section 35-1-90, LLCA., invalidates any agreement which requires an

B. In determining if a claim is of doubtful compensability, the

18

Commission will look to the facts of the matter and will not be bound by

19

mere recitations in the settlement agreement.

20

C. The Commission encourages the settlement of disputed claims on

21

an amicable basis whenever possible. If the claim is not of doubtful

22

compensability, the settlement agreement must be open-ended to the

9

1

extent allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act. Parties will be

2

bound by their agreement to pay and receive a given amount of

3

compensation for a given injury.

4
5
6
7
8
9

D. Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful compensability
shall be subject to approval by the Commission.
E. The agreement shall be final and not subject to further review upon
the same facts merely because of subsequent dissatisfaction.
F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use by parties desirous
of settling claims of doubtful compensability."

10
11

The final sentence of paragraph A of the rule is taken almost word for

12 word from the quoted portion of Wilburn and indicates that such agreements are
13 appropriate if the parties in good faith view the claim as one of disputed validity.
14

Critically, the rule states that the agreement is subject to approval by the

15 commission and that it is final and not subject to review upon the same facts
16 merely because of "subsequent dissatisfaction". The original administrative law
17 judge's letter of June 11, 1991 clearly indicates his understanding that payment of
18 $5,100 in medical expenses would settle the matter and the file would be closed.
19 The administrative law judge signed the order approving the parties' stipulation.
20 The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and order that is the subject of this
21 motion for review states,, "The prior application for hearing did not result in a
22

10

1 hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to a settlement agreement
2 approved by another ALT in July of 1991." (Order, page 1. emphasis added.)
3 Paragraph E of R568-1-16 bars any further review of the agreement. Clearly, the
4 order awarding additional benefits to Biddle was in error.
5

The Industrial Commission is bound by its rule which states that settlement

6 agreements are not subject to review because of later dissatisfaction.
7 Administrative agencies must follow their own rules. In State vs. Utah Merit
8 System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah, 1980), the Supreme Court stated,,"...
9 administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be
10 ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of
11 arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not following its
12 rules, an agency must be held to them." 614 P.2d at 1263.
13

Finally, it should be remembered that the applicant was represented by a

14 lawyer at the time he signed the stipulation agreeing to a dismissal of his
15 application for hearing. Biddle now says that he didn't know what he was doing.
16 If that is the case, and it sounds suspiciously like buyer's remorse, the fact that he
17 had legal counsel who presumptively advised him of the consequences of his act,
18 he should not now be able to come in and claim ignorance.
19
20

CONCLUSION

21

Under Wilburn and under R568-1-16, the parties earlier settlement of Mr.

22 Biddle's claim is binding, further, respondent was not an employee of Petitioner at

11

1 the time of his injury and this appeal should be granted, and the Court of Appeals
2 should enter its order reversing the order of the Industrial Commission awarding
3 additional benefits to the applicant.
4

Dated this 14th day of December, 1994.
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SECTION 35-1-86, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of
the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order.
as last amended by Chapter 72, Laws of Utah 1988

SECTION 35-1-43, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
35-1-43.
"Employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" defined Mining lessees and sublessees - Partners and sole proprietors - Corporate
officers and directors - Real estate agents and brokers.
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative"
mean:
(a)
each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the
service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the state,
serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under any election or
appointment, or under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral,
including each officer and employee of the state institutions of learning and
members of the National Guard while on state active duty; and
(b)
each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section
35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same
business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or
illegally working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is
casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of his
employer.
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any
lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of the
lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and
shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent as if
they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid employees for
substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of
work.
(3) (a)
A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an
employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of the
sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this election, it
shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon the commission
naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of a sole
13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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28
29
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31
32
33
34
35
36
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proprietorship is considered an employee under this chapter until this notice has
been given. For premium rate making, the insurance carrier shall assume the
salary or wage of the employee to be 150% of the state's average weekly wage.
(b)
A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the
corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makeb this
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon me
commission naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or
officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this
notice has been given.
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative"
do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section
61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker if:
(a)
substantially all of the real estate agent's or associated broker's
income for services is from real estate commissions;
(b)
the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are
performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an
independent contractor; and
(c)
the contract states that the real estate agent or associated broker is
not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes.
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative"
do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19,
except as required by federal statute or regulation.
as last amended by Chapters 106 and 130, Laws of Utah 1993

SECTION 35-1-90 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
35-1-90.

Void agreements between employers and employees.

No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this title
shall be valid. No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the premium
paid by his employer shall be valid. Any employer who deducts any portion of
such premium from the wages of salary of any employee entitled to the benefits of
this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than $100 for
each such offense.
No change since 1953

14
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any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached. The Rules are designed
to provide guidance to lawyers and to
provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.
They are not designed to be a basis for
civil liability.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should
be deemed to augment any substantive
legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a
duty.
In the Terminology section, "partner" is
defined as "[denoting] a member of a partnership and a shareholder in a law firm
organized as a professional corporation."
Rule 5.1 delineates the responsibilities of
a partner or supervisory tewyer in Jaw
firms and associations. Rule 5.1(a) states a
partner's obligation is to ensure reasonable
efforts are made to be sure that all lawyers
within the firm conform to the Rules.
Rule 5.1(b) specifically requires supervisory
lawyers to make reasonable efforts to ensure those lawyers they supervise conform
to the Rules.
Rule 5.1(c) states:
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge
of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority
over the other lawyer, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but fails to take reasonable remedial
action.
The Comment to Rule 5.1 is also instructive. "Apart from this Rule and Rule
8.4(a),2 a lawyer does not have disciplinary
liability for the conduct of a partner, associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer
may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law
beyond the scope of these Rules." Clearly
2. Rule 8.4(a): It is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist

the Utah Supreme Court is only concerned
With potential disciplinary actions and has
specifically refrained from addressing
questions of civil liability. In regulating
the practice of law, the Supreme Court has
done nothing to change those principles of
corporate law discussed earlier.
The dismissal of the trial court is affirmed. Costs against plaintiffs.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.

Gilbert R. WILBURN, Plaintiff,
v.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 860292-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 19, 1988.
Claimant appealed from a decision of
the Industrial Commission that a compromise and settlement agreement barred a
claim for permanent total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held
that: (1) the agreement was ambiguous
with respect to whether it released only
claims for temporary total disability and
permanent partial disability benefits, or
whether it also released permanent total
disability claims; (2) extrinsic evidence supported the conclusion that the claim for
permanent total disability benefits was
barred; (3) evidence supported the administrative law judge's finding that the parties
had a good-faith dispute about the compensability of the claim, so that the agreement was enforceable; and (4) the Commisor induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another.

WILBURN v. INTERSTATE ELEC.
Cite as 748 P~2d 582 (Utah App. 1988)
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fore, compromise and settlement agreement was enforceable. U.C.A.1953, 35-190.
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>1124
Industrial Commission should implement regulations governing settlement of
claims to safeguard against abuses that
might otherwise occur if unscrupulous employer or carrier attempts to take advantage of unsophisticated worker seeking to
settle claim without advice of counsel.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-116(l)(e), 35-1-90.
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>1138
Industrial Commission's failure to
adopt regular process for review and approval of settlements was not so arbitrary
and capricious as to warrant reversal of
decision that compromise and settlement
agreement barred application for permanent total disability benefits. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-l-16(l)(e), 35-1-90.

Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory
(argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
Stuart L. Poelman (argued), Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for
Interstate Elec. & Nat'l Union.
Erie V. Boorman (argued), Second Injury
Fund, Salt Lake City.
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff Wilburn appeals from an Industrial Commission order denying his application for permanent total disability benefits
under Utah's Workers' Compensation laws.
The Commission's decision was premised
on the ground that plaintiff had previously
compromised and settled his claim. Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commission's order and an award of permanent total disability benefits. We affirm.
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FACTS
Plaintiff worked at Interstate Electric as
a heavy duty mechanic repairing and overhauling portable power plants, water
pumps, and hydraulic telephone pullers.
On April 14, 1980, plaintiff injured his back
while trying to lift a portable powerplant
from the floor to his work bench. Plaintiff
continued working the remainder of the
day as well as the two following days.
When the pain did not subside, he consulted a doctor. After missing a few days of
work, he continued working for the rest of
the year with no other medical treatment.
On February 2, 1981, Interstate Electrics insurance carrier, defendant National
Union, had plaintiff submit to an independent physical examination, which resulted
in a permanent partial impairment rating of
20%. Fifteen percent of the impairment
was attributable to preexisting causes, paid
by the Second Injury Fund, and 5% attributable to aggravation of the preexisting
condition by the industrial accident, paid by
Interstate Electric. Plaintiff continued
working until he was laid off on July 31,
1981. Following another examination, he
was placed on temporary total disability on
August 18, 1981. On June 20, 1983, plaintiff was reexamined and received a permanent partial impairment rating of 36%, with
10% attributable to the industrial accident,
15% to preexisting problems in his lumbar
and lumbosacral spine, and 15% to a non-industrial cervical spine condition.
In late 1983, plaintiff consulted an administrative law judge who advised him to
make a claim for permanent total disability.
Plaintiff contacted Interstate Electric's
carrier, asserted his claim, and was referred to the carrier's attorney. The attorney told plaintiff that if he claimed permanent total disability, Interstate Electric
would raise several defenses, including the
"no accident" defense, and if it prevailed,
plaintiff would lose his claim for all additional compensation. Plaintiff then agreed
to settle for an additional 10% permanent
partial disability. Upon receiving a written
Compromise and Settlement Agreement,
plaintiff consulted with an Industrial Commission attorney, and as a result, asked

that the agreement contain an additional
$1,590.00 for temporary total disability benefits during the fall of 1983. The agreement was revised as requested, signed by
both parties, and approved by the Industrial Commission in November 1984. Defendants then paid plaintiff as required in the
agreement.
Despite the agreement, in early 1986
plaintiff filed an application with the Industrial Commission seeking permanent total
disability compensation from defendants.
A hearing was held on the application and
the administrative law judge issued his "Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order" on May 28, 1986, in which he
expressed "no doubt" as to the compensability of plaintiffs claim, found him to be
permanently and totally disabled, and imposed liability for permanent total disability upon defendants. Defendants filed a
"Motion for Review and Clarification" and
the administrative law judge then issued
his "Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order," vacating his
prior order. Specifically, the judge found
that, while he would have held that Wilburn sustained a "compensable accident,"
there was a bona fide dispute as to defendants' liability for plaintiffs alleged industrial injury. The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was therefore binding
and barred plaintiffs claim for permanent
total disability compensation.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he did
not release his claim for permanent total
disability benefits upon signing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement and, if
his claim was released by the agreement,
that the settlement was void as against
public policy and in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974).
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
We first address the issue of whether the
agreement between the parties settled
plaintiffs claim for permanent total disability benefits. When a contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law.
See, e.g., Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d
714, 716 (Utah 1985); Seashores Inc. v.
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
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If it is ambiguous,—and the determination
of whether or not a contract is ambiguous
is itself a question of law—extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent must be
received and considered in an effort to glean what the parties actually agreed to.
Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d at 647.
If a trial court interprets a contract as a
matter of law, on appeal the trial court's
resolution is afforded no particular deference. Id. On the other hand, if the contract is ambiguous and the trial forum
finds facts respecting the intention of the
parties based on extrinsic evidence, then
appellate review is strictly limited and the
findings and judgment of the trier will not
be disturbed if based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Id,; Utah
R.Civ.P. 52.
[1] Accordingly, we must first determine, as a matter of law, whether the contract is ambiguous. Plaintiff argues that
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement is unambiguous in its release of only
his claim for temporary total disability and
permanent partial disability benefits since
it does not specifically mention permanent
total disability. The difficulty with this
position is that the contract does not refer
specifically even to the claims defendant
concedes were released by the document.
Thus, while it is clear the parties meant to
settle something, it is unclear what claim
or claims they meant to settle.
1. Several Utah cases have invoked the doctrine
but have typically not elaborated on its proper
role. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d
1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) ('The well-established
rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect
to construction of a contract should be resolved
against the party who had drawn the agreement."); Parks Enters., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also
settled law that a contract will be construed
against the drafter."); In re Estate of Orris, 622
P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1980) (language of an ambiguous instrument should be construed most
strictly against the party who drafted the instrument). The case of Wells Fargo Bank v. Midwest Realty <fr Fin., Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah
1975), recognizes that where a document is ambiguous, it is appropriate to construe it "strictly
against the party who wrote it," but also appropriate to "take extraneous evidence and look to
the total circumstances to determine what the

Since the contract is ambiguous, it was
appropriate for the administrative law
judge to consider extrinsic evidence in an
effort to find the intentions of the parties
in entering into the agreement. Plaintiff
argues, however, that the extrinsic evidence in this case does not support a finding that the agreement contemplated a release of his permanent total disability
claim. In this regard, plaintiff urges application of the doctrine that ambiguities in a
contract should be construed against the
party responsible for its drafting.
A. Construction Against Drafter
[2] Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine
that contracts should be construed against
the drafter.1 The doctrine does not operate
in dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity has been found. Once a contract is
deemed ambiguous, the next order of business is to admit extrinsic evidence to aid in
interpretation of the contract. It is only
after extrinsic evidence is considered and
the court is still uncertain as to the intention of the parties that ambiguities should
be construed against the drafter.2 In other
words, the doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last
resort by the fact-finder after the receipt
and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic
evidence has left unresolved what the parties actually intended. This rule has been
summarized as follows:
parties should reasonably be deemed to have
understood thereby." Id. at 885. While the
opinion does not say so, it is obvious there is
nothing left to construe—"strictly against the
party who wrote it" or otherwise—if extraneous
evidence clearly establishes "what the parties
should reasonably be deemed to have understood" in executing an agreement.
2. There are arguable exceptions to this rule,
including where insurance and surety contracts
are concerned. See, e.g., Shelter America Corp.
v. Ohio Cos. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843 (Utah
Ct.App. 1987). However, such exceptions may
be explained, at least in part, by the fact that
such contracts are ordinarily not preceded by
discussion or negotiation of specific terms and,
thus, absent meaningful extrinsic evidence as to
intent, recourse must be had directly to the
maxim that ambiguities should be construed
against the drafter.
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After applying all of the ordinary processes of interpretation, including all existing usages, general, local, technical,
trade, and the custom and agreement of
the two parties with each other, having
admitted in evidence and duly weighed
all the relevant circumstances and communications between the parties, there
may still be doubt as to the meaning that
should be given and made effective by
the court. If . . . the remaining doubt as
to the proper interpretation is merely as
to which of two possible and reasonable
meanings should be adopted, the court
will adopt that one which is less favorable in its legal effect to the party who
chose the words.
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559
(1960).
B. Extrinsic Evidence
[3] In this case, the judge received extrinsic evidence, including testimony of the
Commission's former legal counsel who approved the agreement, plaintiff's own testimony, and other testimony on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement,
and concluded, as a matter of fact, that the
agreement was validly executed by the parties as a settlement of a disputed claim,
including for permanent total disability
benefits. Although the evidence was in
conflict, ample evidence supports the
judge's findings in this regard.
Reviewing the record, we have some
doubt about whether the decision reached
by the judge was the fairest or the most
appropriate in view of the extrinsic evidence. However, our approval or disapproval of the substantive decision reached
is largely irrelevant. "[W]e give maximum
deference to the basic facts determined by
the agency, which will be sustained if there
is evidence of any substance that can be
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made." Wilson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 735 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah Ct.App.
1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial
Comm'n, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah
1987)). Deference, always due by appellate
courts to fact-finders, is maximized where,
as here, the Legislature has comprehen-

sively delegated responsibility over a particular subject to a specialized administrative agency. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16
(1987). See, e.g., Department of Admin.
Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d
601, 608-10 (Utah 1983); Central Bank &
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 16,
497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972).
SECTION 35-1-90
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the
contract and the findings of the administrative law judge, plaintiff argues that the
agreement is nonetheless void as against
public policy and in violation of § 35-1-90
of Utah's Workers' Compensation statutes.
Section 35-1-90 provides, in relevant part:
"No agreement by an employee to waive
his rights to compensation under this title
shall be valid." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90
(1974).
[4] Under this provision, settlements
are appropriate only when the compensable
nature of the worker's injury is disputed
and the worker's right to recover is doubtful. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889
(1929). Conversely, when the compensability of a workers' compensation claim is not
disputed, an employee cannot waive his
claim by agreement. Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah
371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943).
[5] The administrative law judge in this
case focused on the effect of these two
cases on plaintiff's claim and determined
that the settlement should be enforced only
if there had been a bona fide dispute as to
the compensability of plaintiffs claim.
Recognizing that the issue was not so
much whether the judge believed the applicant sustained a compensable accident as it
was a matter of what the parties believed
and acted upon, the administrative law
judge reversed his initial, tentative decision
and found that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement was validly executed by
the parties as a settlement of a disputed
claim, including for permanent total disability, and was not in violation of § 35-1-90.
While we would have no difficulty in
finding the applicant's claim compensable,
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jree with the administrative law judge
this determination cannot "supplant
udgment of those who earlier, in good
, viewed this claim as one of doubtful
>ensability."3 Since there is sufficient
mce to support the judge's finding that
parties had a good faith dispute as to
compensability of the claim, we defer to
determination. In view of that find§ 35-1-90 is no bar to enforceability of
agreement.

erning these procedures. Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-10 (1974). Clearly, then, the Commission has the prerogative to adopt regulations governing the settlement of claims.
Implicit in the Commission's practice of
reviewing proposed settlements is the concomitant responsibility of the Commission
to assure that an applicant is aware of the
scope and consequences of his or her settlement agreement. Moreover, when important rights are at issue, they should not be
left to the vagaries of self-serving recall.
TOWARDS A MORE REGULAR
If it is true, as defendants suggest, that
PROCEDURE
the
Industrial Commission approves as
5] We acknowledge, as did the adminmany
as fifty of these settlements a year,
ative law judge, the "harsh consethen
the
Commission should implement a
jnces" of this decision but agree that
process
which
will operate, as the adminisimpassion for the Applicant does not justrative
law
judge
stated, to "safeguard
f the erosion of a principle and policy
against
abuses
that
might otherwise occur,
rtaining to compensation agreements
if
an
unscrupulous
employer
or insurance
nerally." The parties tell us that it has
en the policy of the Industrial Commis- carrier attempts] to take advantage of an
>n to encourage the settlement of claims unsophisticated worker seeking to settle a
id that it has been the practice of the claim without the advice of counsel."
>mmission to approve settlement agree[7] It seems to us that the Commission
ents before their execution. The Legislate specifically granted to the Industrial should formalize its long-standing practice
ommission the power and authority to of getting involved in the settlement of
romote the expedited resolution of claims claims. Pursuant to its rule making aunder the Workers' Compensation statutes, thority, the Commission should adopt prolection 35-1-16 provides:
cedures defining its role in settlements. To
It shall be the duty of the commission, help avoid disputes like the instant one, it
and it shall have full power, jurisdiction, might, by rule, require the use of a stanand authority:
dard, unambiguous form specifically delineating which claims are released and
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, which, if any, are preserved by the agreemediation and conciliation of disputes be- ment6 While such a regularized process
tween employers and employees.4
of review and approval of settlements by
the Commission seems clearly preferable,
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1974).
we
cannot say the failure heretofore to
The Commission is likewise vested with
have
adopted such a process is so arbitrary
the authority to promulgate rules for gov3. Interstate Electric's argument about the "compensability" of Wilburn's claim was not altogether implausible given the state of flux surrounding the definition of "accident" at the time
plaintiffs claim was filed. See, e.g., Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).
4. Subsequent legislation has changed the format
of, but not the language quoted from,
§ 35-1-16. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-16(l)(e)
(1987).
3. The Commission has developed a "Compensation Agreement" form. "This form is used by

the parties to a workers' compensation claim to
enter into an agreement as to a permanent partial impairment award, and must be submitted
to the Commission for approval." Workers'
Compensation
Rules
and
Regulations
§ R490-1-2(P) (effective March 4, 1986, as
amended). The "Compensation Agreement," the
Commission's Form 019, is used in situations
where there is no dispute about the occurrence
or compensability of an accident to document
that a claimant "accepts the compensation and
Medical payments paid to date and agrees with
the permanent partial disability rating shown
above."
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and capricious as to warrant reversal in
this case.
The Industrial Commission's order is affirmed.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

2. Judgment <3=>185.3(9)
Material issue of fact existed as to
legal residence of adoptive parents at time
of adoption, precluding summary judgment
in grandmother's action to vacate adoption;
adoption petition was filed in November
and affidavit of division of family services
representative stated that adoptive parents
moved out of jurisdiction in September.
U.C.A.1953, 20-2-14, 78-30-7.
3. Adoption <s=»12

In the Matter of the Adoption of K.O.,
aka K.D., a minor,

Natural grandmother of child was entitled to notice of adoption and an opportunity to establish and enforce her rights as to
child; grandmother had taken care of child
since birth.

v.

Helen DENISON, Petitioner
and Appellant.
No. 870246-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 21, 1988.

Natural grandmother of child sought
to vacate adoption of child. The First District Court, Cache County, Omer J. Call, J.,
granted adoptive parent's motion for summary judgment, and grandmother appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, J.,
held that: (1) remand was necessary, as
trial court decided summary judgment motion before grandmother's time to answer
motion had expired; (2) material issue of
fact existed as to whether adoptive parents
were residents of state at time of filing
petition for adoption; and (3) grandmother
was entitled to notice of adoption proceedings and opportunity to establish and enforce her rights in child.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error e»1073(l)
Remand of grant of summary judgment motion was required, as court granted motion two days before expiration of
nonmovant's time to answer motion.

Anne Milne, Utah Legal Services, Inc.,
M. David Eckersley (Argued), Houpt &
Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for petitioner
and appellant.
Marlin J. Grant (Argued), Olson & Hoggan, Logan, for respondents (Adoptive Parents).
Before BENCH, ORME and
DAVIDSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Petitioner Helen Denison appeals from
an order of summary judgment which denied a motion to set aside her grandson's
adoption and also denied her motion for
continuance to permit discovery.
Petitioner is the natural grandmother of
the child at issue who was born on August
10, 1977. Approximately six years after
the child's birth, the parental rights of the
natural parents were terminated by order
of the Second District Juvenile Court. After having been under the primary care of
petitioner from birth until the adoption
placement, the child was placed with the
Division of Family Services for placement
in a suitable adoptive home. On April 23,
1984, the Division of Family Services
placed the child in the home of Mr. & Mrs.
W (the W's) who, at that time, were residents of Cache County, Utah. On Septem-
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Likewise in Home Builders Association of
Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas
City,1 the Missouri Supreme Court held:
if the burden cast upon the
subdivider is reasonably attributable to
his activity, then the requirement [of dedication or fees in lieu thereof] is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to
a confiscation of private property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation
under the police power. Insofar as the
establishment of a subdivision within a
city increases the recreational needs of
the city, then to that extent the cost of
meeting that increase indeed may reasonably be required of the subdivider. (Emphasis in original.)
In this case the rule adopted by this
Court in Call J, quoted antey cannot be
applied without plaintiffs being given the
opportunity to present evidence to show
that the dedication required of them had no
reasonable relationship to the needs for
flood control or parks and recreation facilities created by their subdivision, if any.
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that
if the subdivision generates such needs and
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedication, it is only fair that the fee so collected be used in such a way as to benefit
demonstrably the subdivision in question.
This is not to say that the benefit must be
solely to the particular subdivision, but only
that there be some demonstrable benefit to
it.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No costs awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, By and Through the DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
UTAH MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL and
William A. Callahan, Defendants
and Appellant
No. 16501.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 3, 1980.
State sought review of a decision of the
Merit System Council ordering the reemployment of an employee of the Department of Community Affairs. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that the exclusion of the director of
the Department of Community Affairs
from a portion of the administrative hearing because she was a witness in the proceeding was reversible error and the attendance by a deputy director, who directed
another arm of the operation and lacked
full knowledge of the case, was not sufficient to provide the Department with appropriate representation.
Affirmed.
1. Officers and Public Employees <&=»72(1)
Both parties to proceeding before Merit
System Council were entitled to have testimony taken under oath or affirmation.
2. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2)
Failure to place witnesses before Merit
System Council under oath was not reversibly erroneous where no objection was
raised until State sought review of Council
order in district court.
3. Officers and Public Employees <s=*72(2)
Omissions from record of proceeding
before Merit System Council were not re-

7. 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977).
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versibly erroneous where affidavits were
received to cure those omissions in record
and no claim was made that affidavits were
in error on any material issue.
4. Officers and Public Employees <s=»72(l,
2)
In proceeding before Merit System
Council to review dismissal of agency employee, exclusion of director of agency from
portion of administrative hearing because
she was witness in proceeding was reversibly erroneous and attendance by deputy
agency director, who directed another arm
of operation and lacked full knowledge of
case, was not sufficient to provide agency
with appropriate representation.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>469
Administrative hearings need not have
all of the formality of judicial procedure
and degree of formality may depend upon
nature of administrative proceeding.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=*391, 416
Administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or followed by agency to suit
its own purposes, and agency must be held
to those regulations without compelling
ground for not following them.

STEWART, Justice:
Defendant William Callahan was terminated as an employee of the Department of
Community Affairs. The Utah Merit System Council ordered his reemployment.
The State of Utah sought review in a district court which reversed and remanded.
The district court directed the Council to
hold a new hearing on the ground that
three procedural errors had been committed
during the hearing before the Merit System
Council, i. e., failure to place witnesses under oath, failure to maintain a complete
record of the testimony adduced, and exclusion of a party to the action from the
proceedings. Callahan now appeals from
the district court order setting aside the
decision of the Utah Merit Council. Callahan urges on appeal that none of the
grounds relied on by the district court justifies a new hearing before the Merit Council.1

J. Francis Valerga, Salt Lake City, for
Callahan.
Anthony L. Rampton of Fabian &
Clendenin, Salt Lake City, for Utah Merit
System.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., James L.
Barker, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.

Defendant Callahan was director of the
Housing Development Agency in the Department of Community Affairs. The
grounds stated for his termination were
lack of support for administrative policy,
insubordination, inefficiency, disloyalty, and
nonfeasance in performance of his duties.
Defendant appealed the decision to the
Utah Merit System Council. The hearing
lasted an entire day and generated a record
consisting of a 135-page transcript. Although Beth Jarman, the Director of the
Department, was absent from part or all of
the proceedings, the deputy director of that
department was present during the hearing.
The Merit Council found that defendant's
performance as an employee of the Department of Community Affairs had been "for

1. The record fails to establish that defendant
falls within the statutory protection for merit
system employees. Defendant was director of
an agency within the Department of Community Affairs, yet his duties were not sufficiently
set forth to allow a determination, nor were
any facts presented to establish, whether he
may be exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 6713-6(a)(4) (1953), as amended. If such exemption exists in this case, there was no showing
that the administrative hearing process before

the Merit Council was still available to defendant. At the time of defendant's hearings before
the Merit Council (October 30, 1978, and December 12, 1978) Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-13-1
to 67-13-15 (1953), as amended, was the applicable law. The Merit System Act contained
therein has been repealed and superseded by
the Utah State Personnel Management Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-29
(1953), as amended, which became effective
July 1, 1979.
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the most part, of a very high quality," and
that the "immediate cause of his termination appears to be more of a personality
conflict between the appellant and his immediate supervisor than with his job performance." Finding the reasons asserted
for the dismissal not adequately supported
by the evidence, the Merit Council unanimously ordered the defendant to be reinstated. The State filed a petition in the
district court pursuant to Rule 65B,2 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to review the Merit Council order.
[1] On this appeal defendant contends
the district court erred in holding that the
three above-mentioned procedural defects
in the administrative hearing constituted
reversible error. The first contention is
that the lower court erred in ruling that the
Merit Council's failure to swear witnesses
prior to presenting testimony was prejudicial error. Clearly both parties to this proceeding were entitled to have the testimony
under oath or affirmation. Retention of a
job is a legally-protected interest, e. g.,
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92
S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), and loss of a job should
not be countenanced on the basis of statements made by fellow employees not under
oath. On the other hand, the State also has
a legitimate interest in the integrity of a
proceeding to determine job retention. The
public service is indeed a public trust, and
retention of unfit public employees is inimical to the public interest. At the least a
witness who testifies under oath is likely to
be more deliberate and careful in the statements he makes because of the knowledge
that an unbridled tongue may lead to legal
sanctions. Both the State and the employee are therefore entitled to have witnesses
placed under oath in a retention proceeding.
[2] At the first administrative hearing,
plaintiff inquired whether there was a procedure for swearing in the witnesses.
Plaintiff did not object to the failure to
2. The appropriateness of challenging the Merit
System Council's order by extraordinary writ
in the district court was not raised in this case.

administer an oath and simply responded to
the negative response by calling his first
witness. The first time the objection was
raised was on review in the district court.
Because no timely objection was made in
the administrative hearing, the matter was
not appropriately raised before the district
court. Cf. Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Sanders v. Cassity, Utah, 586
P.2d 423 (1978); Steele v. Wilkinson, 10
Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117 (1966); Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185
(1954). See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231
F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956), specifically holding that the requirement of an oath is
waived by the absence of a timely objection.
Therefore the Merit Council proceedings
were not defective for failing to administer
the oath.
[3] The district court also reversed because of an omission in the record of a
discussion which occurred prior to the recording of the proceedings. The affidavit
of the executive secretary of the Merit
Council confirms the Merit Council's position that the only matter discussed prior to
the recording of the proceedings was
whether the hearing should be postponed or
should proceed with just a quorum present.
The record was also considered deficient by
the State due to the loss of the record of
the testimony of Lois Strand, which apparently resulted from a tape recorder malfunctioning. Two affidavits, one by Lois
Strand, the witness whose testimony was
not recorded, and the other by counsel for
the State, summarized the testimony.
These corrections sufficiently cured the defect in this case in view oif the fact that no
claim is made that the affidavits are in
error on any material issue. Waterman v.
State, 35 Misc.2d 954, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1962).
Finally, the district court held that the
exclusion of a witness, Beth Jarman, the
Director of the State agency, from a portion of the administrative hearing was reversible error. We agree. Exclusion of
The issue was not presented to this Court and
therefore is not addressed in this decision.

1262

Utah

614 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

witnesses is a practice designed to prevent a
person's testimony from being influenced1
by the testimony given by other witnesses.i.
Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786 (9thi
Cir. 1967). The time-honored practice ini
judicial proceedings is codified in Rule 43(f),>,
U.R.C.P, providing:
Upon motion of either party, the courtt
shall exclude from the courtroom anyy
witness of the adverse party, not at thee
time under examination, so that he mayy
not hear the testimony of the other witnesses. 3
[4] Statutes in a number of jurisdictionss
establish the right of a party to an action to0
remain in attendance during the entire trial. 4 Our rule is silent on that issue. Inn
some cases there may be reason to differentiate between administrative and judicial1
proceedings, but in this case we hold thatt
the State's personal representative was nott
subject to exclusion. 5 Cf. 6 Wigmore oni
Evidence § 1841 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976);;
75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 62 (1974). This conclusion is based on the proposition that ai
party's presence at the proceedings may be*
essential in assisting in the presentation off
its case and otherwise protecting its interests by observing the conduct of the trial.
The necessity of preserving fundamental1
requirements of procedural fairness in administrative hearings was stated in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &\
Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93, 33 S.Ct.
185, 187, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913):
The Commission is an administrativej
body and, even where it acts in a quasijud'w'm} capacity, is not limited by the}
strict rules, as to the admissibility of evi-\
dence, which prevail in suits between private parties. Int. Com. Comm. v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25, [24 S.Ct. 563, 48 L.Ed. 860J.
But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative
the obligation to preserve the essential
3.

Whereas Rule 43(f) provides mandatory exclusion on motions, U.C.A. § 78-7-4 (1953), as
amended, provides the court with a discretionary power to exclude witnesses from hearing
testimony of others.

rules of evidence by which rights are
asserted or defended. In such cases the
Commissioners cannot act upon their own
information as could jurors in primitive
days. All parties must be fully apprised
of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a
party maintain its rights or make its defense. In no other way can it test the
sufficiency of the facts to support the
finding
. . . .
[5] We recognize that administrative
hearings need not have all the formality of
judicial procedure and that the degree of
formality may depend on the nature of the
administrative proceeding. We also recognize that the person excluded was a representative of the State. Because governmental entities and private citizens are not
on an equal footing as to constitutional
prohibitions and because an arm of the
State is involved herein, the constitutional
requirements of due process do not apply to
the State as they would to a private citizen.
Yet in this case, the State, in accordance
with the Merit Council procedural rules and
because of the nature of the case involved,
should also be allowed to have its representative in attendance at the Council hearing
in order to present, or assist in presenting,
the State's case in chief and rebuttal evidence, and to conduct or assist in conducting Cross-examination to assure an accurate
and complete disclosure of the facts. See
Entrc Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98,
287 P.2d 670 (1955); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 397 (1962).
The question of whether the director of
the plaintiff agency was actually a party to
the proceedings which heard defendant's
appeal and thus entitled to be present is
answered in the affirmative by the Merit
4. Compare, e. g., Tennessee Code § 24-106
(1955); Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
267; Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 615.
5. A party litigant who is also a witness may be
requested to testify first. See Moore v. Chambers, Miss., 199 So.2d 261 (1967).
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System Council's procedural rules. The
Merit System Procedures, Article III, § 2,
H 2b(3)-2b(3Xd) provide:
(3) At the close of the agency representative's oral statements and the testimony
or evidence offered by agency witnesses,
questions may be directed to the representative and each witness by interested
parties. Interested Parties are as follows, and they shall raise questions in the
order named and at times called upon by
the chairman.
(a) The agency representative, on the testimony and evidence of agency witnesses;
and agency witnesses, on the testimony
and evidence of the representative and of
each other witness.
(b) The appellant, on the testimony and
evidence offered by the agency representative and each agency witness. Questions of the appellant at this point should
be aimed at focusing the attention of the
Council on what he considers to be weaknesses of the agency's position or on
points that he will make later when
presenting his case. This is not the proper place for rebuttal or counter arguments.
(c) The Merit System Director, on the
testimony and evidence of the agency
representative and each agency witness.
(d) Council, on the testimony of and evidence offered by the agency representative and each witness. [Emphasis added.]
Article III, § 2, 12(c) provides an identical
procedure for the opposition:
(c) Presentation of the appellant's case—
The procedure here shall be exactly the
same as that for presentation of the case
of the agency except that the roles of the
agency representative and witnesses and
those of the appellant and his witnesses
shall be reversed.

[6] No agency representative with full
knowledge of the case was present at the
proceedings to propose questions. The
Council cannot violate its own procedural
rules by denying an appropriate agency representative access to the proceedings. See
Gardner v. F.C.C., 530 F.2d 1086 (D.C.Cir.
1976); Palmer v. Weinberger, 396 F.Supp.
654 (W.D.N.Y.1975); United States v. RCA
Alaska Communications, Inc., Alaska, 597
P.2d 489 (1978); and Moore v. Oregon State
Penitentiary Corrections Div., 16 Or.App.
536, 519 P.2d 389 (1974). Defendants contend that the procedural rules are merely
"guidelines," but administrative regulations
are presumed to be reasonable and valid
and cannot be ignored or followed by the
agency to suit its own purposes. Such is
the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not
following its rules, an agency must be held
to them. See Bess v. Park, 144 Cal.App.2d
798, 301 P.2d 978 (1956); Augustin v.
Barnes, 41 Colo.App. 533, 592 P.2d 9 (1978);
State v. Parham, Okl., 412 P.2d 142 (1966);
and Lumpkin v. Dept. of Social & Health
Services, 20 Wash.App. 406, 581 P.2d 1060
(1978). The attendance by Deputy Director
Grundfossen, an ad hoc representative who
directed another arm of the operation and
lacked full knowledge of the instant case,
was not sufficient to provide the agency
with appropriate representation.6

6. The deputy director's presence could have
been sufficient had he been properly designated

by the appropriate party as its representative.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.
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